Vibecode 1Password
track this build5 steps, step by step0%A basic encrypted vault is buildable, but browser autofill, mobile apps, passkeys, sharing, recovery, audits, and trust make this a dangerous thing to replace casually.
You are building a lean indie version of 1Password. Create the following project files first, then implement the application by following them. Keep the files updated as decisions change. Do not collapse this into a single README or prompt. ===== README.md ===== # 1Password indie build ## Goal Build the smallest trustworthy replacement for the core 1Password workflow for one developer or a tiny team. ## Scope Create a local encrypted vault, generate passwords, search entries, and optionally sync the encrypted database with a cloud drive. ## Quick start 1. Install the documented dependencies. 2. Copy `.env.example` to `.env`. 3. Run the development command chosen during implementation. 4. Complete the acceptance checks in `BUILD_PLAN.md`. ## Honest limits This build deliberately does not replace: - browser/mobile autofill - passkey support - secure sharing - recovery - audits - watchtower alerts - family/team management If those capabilities are essential, use KeePassXC instead of pretending the gap is solved. ===== AGENTS.md ===== # Agent instructions - Optimize for a working, understandable weekend build. - Prefer the fewest moving parts that satisfy the brief. - Do not invent cryptography, security guarantees, APIs, or compliance claims. - Keep secrets out of source control and logs. - Add focused tests for destructive, security-sensitive, and data-loss paths. - Run the project checks before declaring the build complete. - Record any deliberate shortcut in the README under "Tradeoffs". ===== BUILD_PLAN.md ===== # Build plan ## Original build brief Build me a local encrypted password vault to replace 1Password, CLI-first. Requirements: - A single-binary CLI in Go using filippo.io/age for encryption and Argon2id (golang.org/x/crypto) to derive the key from my master passphrase. Use the library primitives exactly as documented, invent no crypto. - The vault is one encrypted file at ~/.vault/vault.age holding JSON entries: name, username, password, URL, notes, updated timestamp. - Commands: add, get <name> (copies to clipboard, clears it after 20 seconds), ls, gen (32-char random password), edit, rm. - Fuzzy name matching on get; never print a password to stdout unless --show is passed. - vault backup writes a date-suffixed copy of the encrypted file to a folder set in .env; it is already encrypted, so any cloud drive can sync it. - Import from a 1Password CSV export so I can migrate in one command. - Everything local: no server, no accounts, no telemetry. - Out of scope: browser autofill, passkeys, and secure sharing. Those are why people pay 1Password; if I need them the honest move is KeePassXC or Bitwarden, say exactly that in the README. - README: a five-line threat model, how key derivation works, and a warning that losing the master passphrase loses everything, there is no recovery. ## Required capabilities - strong encryption library - secure key derivation - browser extension if autofill matters - mobile/desktop storage - backup plan ## Delivery order 1. Scaffold the smallest runnable application and document its commands. 2. Implement the primary data model and core workflow. 3. Add validation, safe failure states, and persistence. 4. Cover the critical path with automated tests. 5. Exercise a clean install from the README and fix every missing step. ## Done when - A new user can go from clone to first successful workflow using only the README. - The core workflow works without paid infrastructure unless the brief requires it. - Tests cover the highest-risk behavior. - Known limitations are explicit rather than hidden. ===== .env.example ===== # Copy to .env and document every variable when it is introduced. # Never put real credentials in this file. APP_ENV=development # Add only values required by the selected implementation.
You are building a lean indie version of 1Password. Create the following project files first, then implement the application by following them. Keep the files updated as decisions change. Do not collapse this into a single README or prompt. ===== README.md ===== # 1Password indie build ## Goal Build the smallest trustworthy replacement for the core 1Password workflow for one developer or a tiny team. ## Scope Create a local encrypted vault, generate passwords, search entries, and optionally sync the encrypted database with a cloud drive. ## Quick start 1. Install the documented dependencies. 2. Copy `.env.example` to `.env`. 3. Run the development command chosen during implementation. 4. Complete the acceptance checks in `BUILD_PLAN.md`. ## Honest limits This build deliberately does not replace: - browser/mobile autofill - passkey support - secure sharing - recovery - audits - watchtower alerts - family/team management If those capabilities are essential, use KeePassXC instead of pretending the gap is solved. ===== AGENTS.md ===== # Agent instructions - Optimize for a working, understandable weekend build. - Prefer the fewest moving parts that satisfy the brief. - Do not invent cryptography, security guarantees, APIs, or compliance claims. - Keep secrets out of source control and logs. - Add focused tests for destructive, security-sensitive, and data-loss paths. - Run the project checks before declaring the build complete. - Record any deliberate shortcut in the README under "Tradeoffs". ===== BUILD_PLAN.md ===== # Build plan ## Original build brief Build me a local encrypted password vault to replace 1Password, CLI-first. Requirements: - A single-binary CLI in Go using filippo.io/age for encryption and Argon2id (golang.org/x/crypto) to derive the key from my master passphrase. Use the library primitives exactly as documented, invent no crypto. - The vault is one encrypted file at ~/.vault/vault.age holding JSON entries: name, username, password, URL, notes, updated timestamp. - Commands: add, get <name> (copies to clipboard, clears it after 20 seconds), ls, gen (32-char random password), edit, rm. - Fuzzy name matching on get; never print a password to stdout unless --show is passed. - vault backup writes a date-suffixed copy of the encrypted file to a folder set in .env; it is already encrypted, so any cloud drive can sync it. - Import from a 1Password CSV export so I can migrate in one command. - Everything local: no server, no accounts, no telemetry. - Out of scope: browser autofill, passkeys, and secure sharing. Those are why people pay 1Password; if I need them the honest move is KeePassXC or Bitwarden, say exactly that in the README. - README: a five-line threat model, how key derivation works, and a warning that losing the master passphrase loses everything, there is no recovery. ## Required capabilities - strong encryption library - secure key derivation - browser extension if autofill matters - mobile/desktop storage - backup plan ## Delivery order 1. Scaffold the smallest runnable application and document its commands. 2. Implement the primary data model and core workflow. 3. Add validation, safe failure states, and persistence. 4. Cover the critical path with automated tests. 5. Exercise a clean install from the README and fix every missing step. ## Done when - A new user can go from clone to first successful workflow using only the README. - The core workflow works without paid infrastructure unless the brief requires it. - Tests cover the highest-risk behavior. - Known limitations are explicit rather than hidden. ===== .env.example ===== # Copy to .env and document every variable when it is introduced. # Never put real credentials in this file. APP_ENV=development # Add only values required by the selected implementation.
You are building a production product version of 1Password. Create the following project files first, then implement the application by following them. Keep the files updated as decisions change. Do not collapse this into a single README or prompt. ===== PRODUCT.md ===== # 1Password product brief ## Problem A basic encrypted vault is buildable, but browser autofill, mobile apps, passkeys, sharing, recovery, audits, and trust make this a dangerous thing to replace casually. ## Product outcome Create a local encrypted vault, generate passwords, search entries, and optionally sync the encrypted database with a cloud drive. ## Target user A serious builder who needs a maintainable product foundation rather than a one-off demo. ## Required capabilities - strong encryption library - secure key derivation - browser extension if autofill matters - mobile/desktop storage - backup plan ## Explicit non-goals for v1 - browser/mobile autofill - passkey support - secure sharing - recovery - audits - watchtower alerts - family/team management ## Success criteria - The primary workflow is measurable end to end. - Setup is reproducible in a clean environment. - Failure, recovery, and support paths are documented. - Product claims match what the implementation actually guarantees. ===== ARCHITECTURE.md ===== # Architecture ## Starting brief Build me a local encrypted password vault to replace 1Password, CLI-first. Requirements: - A single-binary CLI in Go using filippo.io/age for encryption and Argon2id (golang.org/x/crypto) to derive the key from my master passphrase. Use the library primitives exactly as documented, invent no crypto. - The vault is one encrypted file at ~/.vault/vault.age holding JSON entries: name, username, password, URL, notes, updated timestamp. - Commands: add, get <name> (copies to clipboard, clears it after 20 seconds), ls, gen (32-char random password), edit, rm. - Fuzzy name matching on get; never print a password to stdout unless --show is passed. - vault backup writes a date-suffixed copy of the encrypted file to a folder set in .env; it is already encrypted, so any cloud drive can sync it. - Import from a 1Password CSV export so I can migrate in one command. - Everything local: no server, no accounts, no telemetry. - Out of scope: browser autofill, passkeys, and secure sharing. Those are why people pay 1Password; if I need them the honest move is KeePassXC or Bitwarden, say exactly that in the README. - README: a five-line threat model, how key derivation works, and a warning that losing the master passphrase loses everything, there is no recovery. ## Boundaries Separate the product into replaceable modules for interface, application logic, persistence, external integrations, and operational concerns. Keep domain logic independent from delivery frameworks and vendors. ## Production baseline - Configuration: validated at startup with safe local defaults where possible. - Security: least privilege, input validation, secret redaction, rate limits on abuse-prone paths, and no invented security primitives. - Data: explicit schema and migrations, transactional writes where integrity matters, backup and restore instructions. - Integrations: adapters around third-party providers, idempotent webhook or job processing, bounded retries, and timeouts. - Observability: structured logs with request or operation IDs, an error-tracking hook, and health/readiness checks where a server exists. - Quality: unit tests for domain rules, integration tests at module boundaries, and one end-to-end critical-path test. ## Decision records For each major dependency, document why it was chosen, its failure mode, and how it can be replaced. Do not introduce infrastructure until a requirement justifies it. ===== AGENTS.md ===== # Agent instructions - Read `PRODUCT.md` and `ARCHITECTURE.md` before changing code. - Implement milestone by milestone; keep each change reviewable and leave the application runnable. - Treat authentication, payments, encryption, imports, webhooks, and destructive actions as high-risk boundaries when present. - Never invent cryptography or silently weaken a requirement to make a test pass. - Use provider interfaces for external services and deterministic fakes in tests. - Add migrations and rollback or recovery notes for persistent data changes. - Log useful operational context without credentials, tokens, passwords, or personal data. - Update documentation and run all checks before completing a milestone. ===== MILESTONES.md ===== # Delivery milestones ## M0 — Decisions and scaffold - Confirm the runtime, persistence model, threat boundaries, and deployment target. - Create a reproducible local environment and continuous checks. ## M1 — Core workflow - Implement the smallest end-to-end product path with validation and tests. - Keep integrations behind interfaces. ## M2 — Trust layer - Add secure failure behavior, recovery paths, audit-relevant events, and data safeguards. - Test abuse cases and destructive operations. ## M3 — Operability - Add structured logs, error reporting hooks, health signals, backup/restore documentation, and deployment configuration. ## M4 — Release gate - Run a clean-install test, critical-path end-to-end test, dependency review, and documented rollback exercise. - Compare the shipped behavior with `PRODUCT.md` and publish remaining limitations. ===== OPERATIONS.md ===== # Operations ## Before release - Validate configuration and secrets at startup. - Define backup, restore, and rollback procedures and test them. - Document logs, error tracking, health signals, and alert ownership. - Set dependency update and vulnerability review expectations. ## Incident checklist 1. Contain the issue without destroying evidence or user data. 2. Record the timeline and affected scope. 3. Rotate exposed secrets and revoke compromised sessions or credentials. 4. Restore from a verified source when needed. 5. Document the root cause, remediation, and regression test. ## Launch constraint Do not market omitted 1Password capabilities as implemented. The v1 non-goals in `PRODUCT.md` remain user-visible limitations until they are deliberately delivered.
# 1Password indie build ## Goal Build the smallest trustworthy replacement for the core 1Password workflow for one developer or a tiny team. ## Scope Create a local encrypted vault, generate passwords, search entries, and optionally sync the encrypted database with a cloud drive. ## Quick start 1. Install the documented dependencies. 2. Copy `.env.example` to `.env`. 3. Run the development command chosen during implementation. 4. Complete the acceptance checks in `BUILD_PLAN.md`. ## Honest limits This build deliberately does not replace: - browser/mobile autofill - passkey support - secure sharing - recovery - audits - watchtower alerts - family/team management If those capabilities are essential, use KeePassXC instead of pretending the gap is solved.
# Agent instructions - Optimize for a working, understandable weekend build. - Prefer the fewest moving parts that satisfy the brief. - Do not invent cryptography, security guarantees, APIs, or compliance claims. - Keep secrets out of source control and logs. - Add focused tests for destructive, security-sensitive, and data-loss paths. - Run the project checks before declaring the build complete. - Record any deliberate shortcut in the README under "Tradeoffs".
# Build plan ## Original build brief Build me a local encrypted password vault to replace 1Password, CLI-first. Requirements: - A single-binary CLI in Go using filippo.io/age for encryption and Argon2id (golang.org/x/crypto) to derive the key from my master passphrase. Use the library primitives exactly as documented, invent no crypto. - The vault is one encrypted file at ~/.vault/vault.age holding JSON entries: name, username, password, URL, notes, updated timestamp. - Commands: add, get <name> (copies to clipboard, clears it after 20 seconds), ls, gen (32-char random password), edit, rm. - Fuzzy name matching on get; never print a password to stdout unless --show is passed. - vault backup writes a date-suffixed copy of the encrypted file to a folder set in .env; it is already encrypted, so any cloud drive can sync it. - Import from a 1Password CSV export so I can migrate in one command. - Everything local: no server, no accounts, no telemetry. - Out of scope: browser autofill, passkeys, and secure sharing. Those are why people pay 1Password; if I need them the honest move is KeePassXC or Bitwarden, say exactly that in the README. - README: a five-line threat model, how key derivation works, and a warning that losing the master passphrase loses everything, there is no recovery. ## Required capabilities - strong encryption library - secure key derivation - browser extension if autofill matters - mobile/desktop storage - backup plan ## Delivery order 1. Scaffold the smallest runnable application and document its commands. 2. Implement the primary data model and core workflow. 3. Add validation, safe failure states, and persistence. 4. Cover the critical path with automated tests. 5. Exercise a clean install from the README and fix every missing step. ## Done when - A new user can go from clone to first successful workflow using only the README. - The core workflow works without paid infrastructure unless the brief requires it. - Tests cover the highest-risk behavior. - Known limitations are explicit rather than hidden.
# Copy to .env and document every variable when it is introduced. # Never put real credentials in this file. APP_ENV=development # Add only values required by the selected implementation.
# 1Password product brief ## Problem A basic encrypted vault is buildable, but browser autofill, mobile apps, passkeys, sharing, recovery, audits, and trust make this a dangerous thing to replace casually. ## Product outcome Create a local encrypted vault, generate passwords, search entries, and optionally sync the encrypted database with a cloud drive. ## Target user A serious builder who needs a maintainable product foundation rather than a one-off demo. ## Required capabilities - strong encryption library - secure key derivation - browser extension if autofill matters - mobile/desktop storage - backup plan ## Explicit non-goals for v1 - browser/mobile autofill - passkey support - secure sharing - recovery - audits - watchtower alerts - family/team management ## Success criteria - The primary workflow is measurable end to end. - Setup is reproducible in a clean environment. - Failure, recovery, and support paths are documented. - Product claims match what the implementation actually guarantees.
# Architecture ## Starting brief Build me a local encrypted password vault to replace 1Password, CLI-first. Requirements: - A single-binary CLI in Go using filippo.io/age for encryption and Argon2id (golang.org/x/crypto) to derive the key from my master passphrase. Use the library primitives exactly as documented, invent no crypto. - The vault is one encrypted file at ~/.vault/vault.age holding JSON entries: name, username, password, URL, notes, updated timestamp. - Commands: add, get <name> (copies to clipboard, clears it after 20 seconds), ls, gen (32-char random password), edit, rm. - Fuzzy name matching on get; never print a password to stdout unless --show is passed. - vault backup writes a date-suffixed copy of the encrypted file to a folder set in .env; it is already encrypted, so any cloud drive can sync it. - Import from a 1Password CSV export so I can migrate in one command. - Everything local: no server, no accounts, no telemetry. - Out of scope: browser autofill, passkeys, and secure sharing. Those are why people pay 1Password; if I need them the honest move is KeePassXC or Bitwarden, say exactly that in the README. - README: a five-line threat model, how key derivation works, and a warning that losing the master passphrase loses everything, there is no recovery. ## Boundaries Separate the product into replaceable modules for interface, application logic, persistence, external integrations, and operational concerns. Keep domain logic independent from delivery frameworks and vendors. ## Production baseline - Configuration: validated at startup with safe local defaults where possible. - Security: least privilege, input validation, secret redaction, rate limits on abuse-prone paths, and no invented security primitives. - Data: explicit schema and migrations, transactional writes where integrity matters, backup and restore instructions. - Integrations: adapters around third-party providers, idempotent webhook or job processing, bounded retries, and timeouts. - Observability: structured logs with request or operation IDs, an error-tracking hook, and health/readiness checks where a server exists. - Quality: unit tests for domain rules, integration tests at module boundaries, and one end-to-end critical-path test. ## Decision records For each major dependency, document why it was chosen, its failure mode, and how it can be replaced. Do not introduce infrastructure until a requirement justifies it.
# Agent instructions - Read `PRODUCT.md` and `ARCHITECTURE.md` before changing code. - Implement milestone by milestone; keep each change reviewable and leave the application runnable. - Treat authentication, payments, encryption, imports, webhooks, and destructive actions as high-risk boundaries when present. - Never invent cryptography or silently weaken a requirement to make a test pass. - Use provider interfaces for external services and deterministic fakes in tests. - Add migrations and rollback or recovery notes for persistent data changes. - Log useful operational context without credentials, tokens, passwords, or personal data. - Update documentation and run all checks before completing a milestone.
# Delivery milestones ## M0 — Decisions and scaffold - Confirm the runtime, persistence model, threat boundaries, and deployment target. - Create a reproducible local environment and continuous checks. ## M1 — Core workflow - Implement the smallest end-to-end product path with validation and tests. - Keep integrations behind interfaces. ## M2 — Trust layer - Add secure failure behavior, recovery paths, audit-relevant events, and data safeguards. - Test abuse cases and destructive operations. ## M3 — Operability - Add structured logs, error reporting hooks, health signals, backup/restore documentation, and deployment configuration. ## M4 — Release gate - Run a clean-install test, critical-path end-to-end test, dependency review, and documented rollback exercise. - Compare the shipped behavior with `PRODUCT.md` and publish remaining limitations.
# Operations ## Before release - Validate configuration and secrets at startup. - Define backup, restore, and rollback procedures and test them. - Document logs, error tracking, health signals, and alert ownership. - Set dependency update and vulnerability review expectations. ## Incident checklist 1. Contain the issue without destroying evidence or user data. 2. Record the timeline and affected scope. 3. Rotate exposed secrets and revoke compromised sessions or credentials. 4. Restore from a verified source when needed. 5. Document the root cause, remediation, and regression test. ## Launch constraint Do not market omitted 1Password capabilities as implemented. The v1 non-goals in `PRODUCT.md` remain user-visible limitations until they are deliberately delivered.
$ choose a build depth, inspect the files, then open the complete pack in your agent · this prompt is generated from the build plan · improve it via PR
They pay because password managers are one place where reliability and audited security beat saving a few dollars.
xbrowser/mobile autofill
xpasskey support
xsecure sharing
xrecovery
xaudits
xwatchtower alerts
xfamily/team management
Don't feel like building it? These folks already made it free.
no votes, no pay-to-list · just what's real
1Password pricing
| plan | monthly | annual (per mo) | what you get |
|---|---|---|---|
| individual | $3.99/user | $2.99/user | 1 person; unlimited passwords and devices; 1 GB document storage |
| families | $5.99/workspace | $4.49/workspace | Up to 5 family members; unlimited passwords and devices; 1 GB document storage/user |
free tierno free tier; 14-day trial
billingmonthly + annual; advertised annual rate is a first-year promotion
hidden costsThe discounted annual amount is introductory and auto-renews at the then-current regular price; taxes may be added and family seats beyond the included 5 can increase the bill
verified 2026-08-14 · source ↗
Vibecode 1Password
Kinda. The core of 1Password is buildable in a weekend with the prompt on this page, but there are real gaps: browser/mobile autofill, passkey support. Read the honest list above before committing.
How much does 1Password cost?
1Password costs about $2.99/month (Individual, checked 2026-07-30), which is $35.88 per year.
What do I lose by replacing 1Password?
Honestly: browser/mobile autofill; passkey support; secure sharing; recovery; audits; watchtower alerts; family/team management. If any of those are load-bearing for you, keep paying.
Is there an open-source alternative to 1Password?
Yes: Vaultwarden (Passwords, passkeys, notes, sharing, and reports on your server; polished recovery support becomes your problem.) Bitwarden Free (Unlimited passwords, passkeys, secure notes, and one-person sharing; built-in TOTP and full reports cost extra.) The prompt is for when you want it exactly your way.